Supply Risk
Tightening
Net score +4.0 · ≥ +2 tightening / ≤ −2 easing
+2.0
Importer margin tightening
P&K landed cost 30% above MRP+NBS support — importers underwater, availability risk; urea subsidy ≈1340% of MRP (fiscal exposure to LNG/INR, not availability)
+1.0
Subsidy bill tightening
urea landed cost in top quartile (99th pct) — subsidy-bill strain
+1.0
Chokepoint tightening
P 100% sourced from at-risk origins — fragile concentration
India's farmgate price is administered, so unlike the Brazil report there is no
grower-barter read. A rising world price instead routes into the subsidy bill (urea, where
the government covers the full cost-MRP delta) or into availability (P&K, where the NBS
subsidy is fixed and importers absorb the residual). This signal is a deliberately transparent sum of those
channels — weigh the components, not just the headline.
DAP importer gap
+30%
landed vs MRP + NBS
Urea subsidy bill
₹72,052/t
landed − MRP (fiscal)
Asia LNG
$17.6
$/MMBtu (R-LNG proxy)
Landed cost = Pink Sheet DAP ($/t) + freight, converted at INR/USD. The supported realization is the farmer MRP (₹1,350/50 kg) plus the per-tonne NBS subsidy, computed from the notified per-kg rates and DAP's 18-46-0 grade — the support line shows only seasons with notified rates. When landed cost runs above support, importers are underwater: the gap must be absorbed by a coming subsidy hike (fiscal) or by short supply (availability).
DAP is the binding phosphate India imports and the most policy-salient product. Current landed cost is
₹77,812/t against
₹59,787/t of support (MRP ₹1,350/50 kg + NBS
₹32,787/t) — a gap of
+30%. The NBS subsidy is computed from the
notified per-kg rates, and reproduces the government's own notified per-tonne figures — so the gap is a
fully transparent calculation, not a black box.
| Product | World FOB | Landed CFR |
Support / subsidy | Gap vs support | Channel |
|---|
| DAP (phosphate) | $770 | ₹77,812 | ₹59,787 | +30% | availability leg — MRP + NBS |
| Urea (nitrogen) | $770 | ₹77,430 | ₹5,378 (MRP) | +1340% | fiscal leg — govt covers the gap (subsidy bill) |
| MOP (potash) | $405 | ₹42,035 | NBS ₹1,428/t | — | decontrolled MRP (not modelled v1) |
Asia LNG (R-LNG proxy) drives the urea cash cost — ~63% of India's fertilizer-sector gas is imported — while the rupee scales every USD-quoted landed cost. Both push the importer-margin gap and the urea subsidy bill in the same direction. Source: FRED (PNGASJPUSDM, EXINUS).
Nitrogen fertilizer is a gas derivative, and India imports the marginal molecule as R-LNG — so the urea
subsidy bill tracks Asian LNG, while the rupee scales every USD-quoted landed cost. With Asia LNG at
$17.6/MMBtu and the rupee at ₹95.5/$, the urea subsidy
bill runs about ₹72,052/t above the statutory MRP.
India is a structural net importer — most phosphate, effectively all potash — so origin concentration is an
availability risk, not just a price risk. The swing column shows where lower-risk backfill would have to
come from. Shares are by import value (TRADESTAT / DGCI&S), annual fiscal-year.
| Nutrient | At-risk share | At-risk origins (2025-26) |
Lower-risk swing supply | Imports (value) |
|---|
| Nitrogen (urea, 3102) | 39% | China 22%, Russia 16% | Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia | $5,565M |
| Phosphatic (SSP, 3103) | 100% | Morocco 100%, Russia 0% | Saudi Arabia, Jordan | $640M |
| Potash (MOP, 3104) | 44% | Russia 44%, Belarus 0% | Canada, Israel, Jordan | $1,333M |
| DAP / NPK complexes (3105) | 57% | Russia 23%, Morocco 19%, China 15% | Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Australia | $7,012M |
Editorial overlay — China export policy. China is the dominant India chokepoint: NDRC export controls on urea and DAP/MAP (provisional windows from 2024-25) drove India's urea imports from China to collapse to $149.91M (FY24-25) then rebound to $1,250.41M (FY25-26) as windows reopened, forcing India to scramble for Morocco/OCP, Saudi (Ma'aden), Russia and Jordan phosphate/urea cover. Treat China export-policy state as the editorial overlay (analog of Brazil chokepoints).